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We estimate the elasticity of charitable giving with respect to its price and after-tax income using a
panel of over 550,000 disproportionately high-income tax returns spanning the years 1979 through
2005.  Improvements relative to the previous literature include: using state tax variation to help identify
our model while controlling for both individual- and time-specific unobserved heterogeneity; carefully
dealing with expectations; allowing people at different income levels to have different degrees responsiveness
to taxation and different time paths of unobservable influences on giving; and using a measure of charitable
giving that more closely approximates current donations. To address the omitted variable bias that
would otherwise arise from failing to control for unobservable expectations of future prices and future
incomes, we use predictable changes in future federal and state marginal tax rates and tax liabilities,
arising from their pre-announced and phased-in nature, as instruments for future changes in prices
and income.  Our estimate of the elasticity of giving with respect to a persistent price change for the
full sample is about -0.7; this elasticity is generally larger when the sample is limited to high-income
people and we control for time-varying unobservable influences on charity in a flexible fashion.  We
find some evidence, particularly among very high-income people, of re-timing giving in response to
expected future changes in price, but this finding is sensitive to the source of identification for the
price effects.  Our estimates are broadly consistent the permanent income hypothesis.  Expenditures
on charitable giving are estimated to respond more strongly to persistent changes in income than to
transitory fluctuations in income.  Moreover, we find evidence in some specifications that people will








Department of the Treasury
Room 4036B

























































                                                      
1 Feenberg addresses this problem in cross-sectional data by using instruments for price where all the 
variation comes from differences in state tax laws, and he still finds the price elasticity to be large. 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                      
37 When we used the predictable tax change instrument approach, we also found that parameter 
estimates were similar whether we used the two‐year window donations or the five‐year window 
















































































Variable  Description  Mean  Std. Dev. 




















age  Age of primary taxpayer  52.20  12.97 
children  Number of children at home  0.43  0.84 





ln(state house price)  State log median real housing price  11.97  0.37 







































‐0.015  0.040 ‐ 0.001  0.043  0.047  
ΔlnPt‐1  
(0.049)  (0.039)  (0.049)  (0.039)  (0.038)  
0.155  0.237  0.190  0.246  0.240  
ΔlnPt 
(0.058)**  (0.050)**  (0.057)**  (0.050)**  (0.049)**  
‐0.707  ‐0.615  ‐0.680  ‐0.649  ‐0.743  ‐0.671  lnPt  [persistent  
price elasticity]  (0.254)**  (0.074)**  (0.147)**  (0.072)**  (0.074)**  (0.045)** 
‐0.083  0.143 ‐ 0.017  0.136    
ΔlnPfuture 
(0.266)  (0.038)**  (0.157)  (0.039)**    
‐0.059 ‐ 0.059 ‐ 0.055 ‐ 0.059 ‐ 0.060  
ΔlnYt‐1 
(0.007)**  (0.007)**  (0.006)**  (0.007)**  (0.007)**  
‐0.128 ‐ 0.141 ‐ 0.122 ‐ 0.140 ‐ 0.143  
ΔlnYt 
(0.006)**  (0.009)**  (0.008)**  (0.009)**  (0.009)**  
0.906  0.487  0.800  0.478  0.448  0.328  lnYt  [persistent 
income elasticity]  (0.164)**  (0.017)**  (0.129)**  (0.018)**  (0.015)**  (0.011)** 
0.527  0.049  0.482  0.043    
ΔlnYfuture 
(0.179)**  (0.007)**  (0.168)**  (0.008)**    
‐0.191  0.196 ‐ 0.252  0.186  0.212  0.642 
lnP_salestax 
(0.650)  (0.831)  (0.638)  (0.818)  (0.826)  (0.856) 
0.202 ‐ 2.790 ‐ 0.298 ‐ 2.794 ‐ 2.897 ‐ 4.627 
(age/100) squared 
(1.374)  (0.492)**  (1.149)  (0.493)**  (0.498)**  (0.515)** 
0.027  0.029  0.027  0.029  0.030  0.040 
children 
(0.005)**  (0.006)**  (0.005)**  (0.006)**  (0.006)**  (0.005)** 
0.023  0.028  0.027  0.028  0.028  0.033 
other dependents 
(0.005)**  (0.006)**  (0.006)**  (0.006)**  (0.006)**  (0.004)** 
0.016  0.049  0.001  0.048  0.054  0.087 
ln(state house price) 
(0.032)  (0.029)  (0.036)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.026)** 
0.600  0.139  0.548  0.143  0.093  0.381 
state unemployment 
(0.430)  (0.359)  (0.421)  (0.365)  (0.354)  (0.431) 
‐0.052 ‐ 0.167  0.003 ‐ 0.164 ‐ 0.185 ‐ 0.559 
state govʹt spending 
(0.414)  (0.465)  (0.432)  (0.463)  (0.469)  (0.366) 
‐0.469 ‐ 0.520 ‐ 0.474 ‐ 0.538     Transitory price 
elasticity  (0.043)**  (0.053)**  (0.050)**  (0.055)**    
0.251  0.298  0.195  0.294     Transitory income 
elasticity  (0.017)**  (0.009)**  (0.037)**  (0.009)**    
Observations  294,513  294,513  294,513  294,513  294,513  412,128 
Unique taxpaying 























0.083  0.003  0.074  0.168 
ΔlnPt‐1  
(0.046)  (0.059)  (0.062)  (0.068)* 
0.198  0.135  0.191  0.334 
ΔlnPt 
(0.088)*  (0.061)*  (0.064)**  (0.064)** 
‐0.147  ‐0.654  ‐0.483  ‐0.493  lnPt [persistent 
 price elasticity]  (0.330)  (0.195)**  (0.213)*  (0.276) 
0.551  0.070  0.438  0.757 
ΔlnPfuture 
(0.298)  (0.221)  (0.217)*  (0.296)* 
‐0.057 ‐ 0.054 ‐ 0.057 ‐ 0.060 
ΔlnYt‐1 
(0.013)**  (0.007)**  (0.008)**  (0.009)** 
‐0.119 ‐ 0.126 ‐ 0.134 ‐ 0.140 
ΔlnYt 
(0.021)**  (0.008)**  (0.009)**  (0.011)** 
0.104  0.783  0.608  0.557  lnYt  [persistent 
 income elasticity]  (0.283)  (0.115)**  (0.097)**  (0.104)** 
‐0.324  0.386  0.173  0.096 
ΔlnYfuture 
(0.312)  (0.126)**  (0.101)  (0.109) 
‐0.500 ‐ 0.589 ‐ 0.730 ‐ 0.916 
Transitory price elasticity 
(0.052)**  (0.076)**  (0.080)**  (0.080)** 
0.310  0.271  0.301  0.320  Transitory income 
elasticity  (0.033)**  (0.015)**  (0.012)**  (0.014)** 
Observations  114,901  179,612  134,838  93,028 




























‐0.003  0.050  0.121  0.182 
ΔlnPt‐1  
(0.075)  (0.068)  (0.070)  (0.082)* 
0.125  0.267  0.350  0.481 
ΔlnPt 
(0.126)  (0.078)**  (0.076)**  (0.085)** 
‐0.699  ‐0.772  ‐0.832  ‐1.079  lnPt  [persistent  
price elasticity]  (0.200)**  (0.264)**  (0.282)**  (0.320)** 
0.087 ‐ 0.059  0.046  0.088 
ΔlnPfuture 
(0.319)  (0.262)  (0.275)  (0.335) 
‐0.060 ‐ 0.059 ‐ 0.064 ‐ 0.069 
ΔlnYt‐1 
(0.014)**  (0.006)**  (0.007)**  (0.009)** 
‐0.103 ‐ 0.135 ‐ 0.145 ‐ 0.151 
ΔlnYt 
(0.020)**  (0.008)**  (0.007)**  (0.009)** 
0.846  0.806  0.699  0.659  lnYt [persistent  
income elasticity]  (0.155)**  (0.146)**  (0.145)**  (0.162)** 
0.560  0.398  0.257  0.190 
ΔlnYfuture 
(0.165)**  (0.165)*  (0.159)  (0.173) 
‐0.661 ‐ 0.446 ‐ 0.528 ‐ 0.686 
Transitory price elasticity 
(0.051)**  (0.065)**  (0.076)**  (0.071)** 
0.183  0.272  0.297  0.318  Transitory income 
elasticity  (0.027)**  (0.018)**  (0.016)**  (0.015)** 
Observations  114,901  179,612  134,838  93,028 































‐1.157  ‐1.126  ‐1.315  lnPt  [persistent 










0.777  0.579  0.544  lnYt  [persistent  










Observations  179,612  134,838  93,028 















































‐0.015 ‐ 0.074  0.020  0.026 
ΔlnPt‐1  
(0.049)  (0.034)*  (0.041)  (0.041) 
0.155 ‐ 0.026  0.251  0.249 
ΔlnPt 
(0.058)**  (0.045)  (0.070)**  (0.068)** 
‐0.707  ‐0.681  ‐0.753  ‐0.738  lnPt  [persistent 
price elasticity]  (0.254)**  (0.195)**  (0.085)**  (0.086)** 
‐0.083  0.022  0.140  0.149 
ΔlnPfuture 
(0.266)  (0.214)  (0.055)*  (0.059)* 
‐0.059 ‐ 0.052 ‐ 0.048 ‐ 0.047 
ΔlnYt‐1 
(0.007)**  (0.004)**  (0.009)**  (0.009)** 
‐0.128 ‐ 0.085 ‐ 0.120 ‐ 0.121 
ΔlnYt 
(0.006)**  (0.006)**  (0.012)**  (0.013)** 
0.906  1.033  0.407  0.402  lnYt  [persistent 
income elasticity]  (0.164)**  (0.149)**  (0.023)**  (0.023)** 
0.527  0.716  0.020  0.019 
ΔlnYfuture 
(0.179)**  (0.164)**  (0.010)  (0.010) 
‐0.469 ‐ 0.730 ‐ 0.642 ‐ 0.639  Transitory price 
elasticity  (0.043)**  (0.063)**  (0.081)**  (0.080)** 
0.251  0.232  0.266  0.262  Transitory income 
elasticity  (0.017)**  (0.016)**  (0.011)**  (0.011)** 
Observations  294,513  294,513  106,494  106,494 
Unique taxpaying 
units 























‐0.816 ‐ 0.808 ‐ 0.477 ‐ 1.287 
lnPt 
(0.129)**  (0.106)**  (0.112)**  (0.185)** 
0.827  0.831  0.659  0.829 
lnYt 
(0.018)**  (0.016)**  (0.026)**  (0.021)** 
0.027  0.027  0.026  0.046 
age 
(0.004)**  (0.004)**  (0.004)**  (0.006)** 
0.334  0.301 ‐ 0.078 ‐ 1.077 
(age/100) squared 
(0.345)  (0.360)  (0.374)  (0.577) 
0.229  0.223  0.133  0.325 
married 
(0.024)**  (0.023)**  (0.026)**  (0.032)** 
0.122  0.119  0.116  0.123 
children 
(0.007)**  (0.007)**  (0.010)**  (0.010)** 
0.107  0.107  0.093  0.120 
other dependents 
(0.006)**  (0.006)**  (0.008)**  (0.008)** 
 ‐ 1.123 ‐ 2.108 ‐ 0.541 
lnP_salestax 
  (0.982)  (1.121)  (1.187) 
 ‐ 0.028  0.187 ‐ 0.215 
ln(state house price) 
  (0.058)  (0.058)**  (0.077)** 
 ‐ 1.104  0.903 ‐ 2.804 
state unemployment 
  (0.799)  (0.861)  (1.124)* 
  0.865  1.348  0.486 
church 
  (0.253)**  (0.268)**  (0.366) 
  2.038  1.469  2.199 
state govʹt spending 
  (0.869)*  (0.997)  (1.062)* 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  ΔlnPt‐1  ΔlnPt  lnPt  ΔlnPfuture  ΔlnYfuture 
0.779  0.018 ‐ 0.004  0.041  0.119 
ΔlnPt‐1, 1st‐dollar 
(0.011)**  (0.003)**  (0.003)  (0.005)**  (0.015)** 
0.101  0.774 ‐ 0.031  0.078  0.191 
ΔlnPt, 1st‐dollar 
(0.006)**  (0.013)**  (0.005)**  (0.007)**  (0.022)** 
‐0.010 ‐ 0.058  0.868 ‐ 0.658 ‐ 0.305 
lnPt, 1st‐dollar 
(0.006)  (0.008)**  (0.016)**  (0.011)**  (0.034)** 
0.018  0.050  0.062  0.130  0.071  Predictable tax change 
instrument for ΔlnPfuture  (0.004)**  (0.005)**  (0.006)**  (0.018)**  (0.032)* 
0.005 ‐ 0.009  0.007  0.040  0.122  Predictable tax change 
instrument for ΔlnYfuture  (0.002)*  (0.003)**  (0.002)**  (0.004)**  (0.017)** 
‐0.027  0.010 ‐ 0.011  0.252 ‐ 0.408  MTR on capital gains, year 
t, 1st‐dollar  (0.011)*  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.027)**  (0.069)** 
0.038  0.072  0.070  0.076 ‐ 0.105  Expected change in MTR on 
capital gains at t+1  (0.010)**  (0.012)**  (0.011)**  (0.019)**  (0.049)* 
Observations  294,513  294,513  294,513  294,513  294,513 
Unique taxpaying units  59,621  59,621  59,621  59,621  59,621 
Partial R‐squared of 
excluded instruments  0.4284  0.4051  0.5287  0.2397  0.0044 
Shea partial R‐squared  0.4274  0.4442  0.0627  0.0166  0.0026 
P‐value of F‐test on 
excluded instruments  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
All columns also control for individual fixed effects, year dummies, lnP_salestax, (age/100) 
squared, children, other dependents, ln(state house price), state unemployment rate, and state govʹt 
spending.  Robust standard errors, clustered by state and income class, are reported in 
parentheses. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 